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Ecosystems Services Valuation 
Clive Spash1 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Ecosystems are being characterised as goods and services to allow their valuation in 
monetary terms.  This follows an orthodox economic approach to environmental 
values, but is also being undertaken by ecologists and conservation biologist.  There 
appears a lack of clarity and debate as to the model of human behaviour, specific 
values and decision process being adopted.  Arguments for ecosystems service 
valuation are critically appraised and the case for a model leading to value pluralism 
is presented.  The outcome is to identify the need for value articulating processes 
which involve open deliberative judgment.  In discussion of human motivations and 
judgement I make specific appeal to the works of philosopher Alan Holland. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There has been an observable increase in the desire of conservation biologists and 
ecologists for concepts such as biodiversity and ecosystems functions to be 
expressed as part of a mainstream economic philosophy of value (McCauley, 2006).  
In recent years the need for monetary valuation of ecosystems has been voiced 
internationally.2  In 2005 the National Research Council (NRC) in the USA published 
a report on the subject commissioned from six economists, four ecologists and one 
philosopher; aiming for “better environmental decision-making” they adopted a 
narrow “total economic value” approach (Heal et al., 2005).  In 2007 the G8 and five 
other industrialising nations proposed a global cost-benefit assessment of 
biodiversity loss called the “Potsdam Initiative—Biological Diversity 2010.”3  Under a 
clause entitled “The economic significance of the global loss of biological diversity”, 
the parties stated: 
“In a global study we will initiate the process of analysing the global economic 
benefit of biological diversity, the costs of the loss of biodiversity and the failure 
to take protective measures versus the costs of effective conservation.” 
 This study aims to emulate Stern’s climate change report,4 but apparently has 
neglected critiques of that report and such global environmental cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) (see, Spash, 2002a; 2007b; 2007c).  Indeed some already published 
studies—notably led by non-economists and appearing in natural science journals—
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  For example, the “European Biodiversity Research for a Sustainable Europe: Research Contributing 
to the Implementation of the EU Biodiversity Strategy” 12th to 30th March 2007. 
http://www.nbu.ac.uk/biota/e-conference.htm.  “Climate Change and Biodiversity Conservation: 
Knowledge Needed to Support Development of Integrated Adaptation Strategies” 29th August to 16th 
September 2005.  Both organized in cooperation with the European Platform for Biodiversity 
Research Strategy (EPBRS) and the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology (CEH). 
3
 The G8 comprises Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States; 
the five big developing countries at Potsdam were Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa.  The 
G8 Environment Ministers Meeting which produced this declaration was held in Potsdam, 15th to 17th 
March 2007. 
4
 The link to Stern is explicit in the discussions around this biodiversity valuation exercise. See 
http://www.anped.org/index.php?part=424.  Accessed 13th February 2008. 
Ecosystems Services Valuation 
2 
claim to have estimated the monetary value of the World’s ecosystems (Costanza et 
al., 1997) and all remaining wild Nature (Balmford et al., 2002) mainly by averaging 
and then summing values from various contingent valuation method (CVM) studies.  
Groups in the USA (eg. Batker et al., 2005), and elsewhere, are trying to formalise 
the ad hoc ecosystem services valuation approach of such studies for inclusion in 
public policy decision processes. 
One major thrust of this work is linked to a general movement called “benefit 
transfer” which aims for common use in policy of values taken from original monetary 
valuation studies but applied to represent the value of other sites, entities or 
environmental changes, as political necessity dictates (Abt Associates Inc, 2005).  
For example, the mean willingness to pay for wetland ‘goods and services’ of UK 
respondents to a CVM survey may be averaged to a per hectare value and 
transferred to North America.  More sophisticated approaches might employ a 
transfer function, although due to the prevalence of non-economic and socio-
psychological factors these are almost impossible to employ due to lack of available 
data across populations (Brouwer and Spanninks, 1999).  Such transfers are 
defended as being ‘pragmatic’ but, regardless of sophistication, suffer from serious 
practical and methodological problems (Spash and Vatn, 2006).  The numbers are 
attractive because they appear simple to derive and seem to place a ‘market value’ 
on a wide scope and scale of things.  However, the stated preference methods (eg. 
CVM) which mainly underlie these value transfers are themselves deceptively simple 
and the numbers produced may not be all that is claimed, even before such transfers 
distort them out of context. 
The problems can be taken on two levels.  There are the concerns of 
economists over such things as the use of statistical techniques, cross validation, 
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incentive compatible mechanisms, strategic behaviour, information provision, survey 
design and treatment of different bid categories (Spash, 2008a).  Then there are the 
concerns of political scientists, applied philosophers and heterodox economists, 
amongst others, over the role and meaning of the mainstream economic approach.  
Holland (1997: 484) notes the difference between internal critiques where 
refinements and scientific advance are assumed an adequate response, and 
principled arguments which point toward the need for alternative approaches.  He 
identifies six principled arguments in the literature which question the applicability of 
environmental CBA and stated preferences in particular: (i) a variety of ethical 
commitments exist which cannot be made commensurable; (ii) methodological 
individualism inadequately addresses the collective values which constitute 
environmental goods and bads; (iii) the market approach to value elicitation is 
incapable of recognising certain values and precludes their expression; (iv) social 
context is inadequately addressed because the method is too abstract; (v) the 
economic value process suppresses articulation and active thinking by assuming 
values are pre-formed; (vi) environmental values falling within the domain of political 
action are inappropriately addressed as preferences. 
These principled arguments appear to fall into two broad categories.  First are 
those concerning what constitutes environmental values raising such issues as 
incommensurability, pluralism vs. monism, community vs. individuality, utilitarianism 
vs. deontology, objective truth vs. subjective judgement.  Second are those relating 
to the appropriate process whereby values should be expressed, namely markets vs. 
politics, group vs. individual, hypothetical vs. actual, reflective deliberation vs. instant 
reaction, and who such processes should represent (experts, vested interests, 
public) and how (statistically, politically).  The first set of arguments inevitably feed 
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into the second, while, especially for an empirically based science, application of the 
second should influence and inform the first.  That is, belief in say monism leads to 
design of processes using a single numeraire, but when incommensurable and plural 
values arise and are recognised in the value articulating process these should bring 
into question the belief in and relevance of monism. 
A contention of this paper is that there is a stark disconnect between 
environmental values as constituted in mainstream economics and as recognised by 
wider society and other disciplines.  Yet some of those other disciplines, such as 
ecology, are actually employing a broadly defined economic approach in the 
apparent belief that this is a pragmatic solution to the neglect of their principled 
concerns over the loss of wild Nature and biodiversity.  This pragmatic argument in 
support of ecosystem valuation is critically appraised in the next section, along with 
those arising from orthodox economics and scientific empiricism.  One result is to 
question the model of human motivation and behaviour underlying orthodox 
economics and to point to alternative more empirically accurate models.  On this 
basis the need for variety in value articulating institutions is required in order to bring 
forth a more comprehensive and complex picture of how humans value the 
environment and the implications of respecting those values for any policy choice.  
This brings into contrast a process of judgment through deliberation with the appeal 
to instantaneously stated preferences.  The potential role for monetary calculations is 
not excluded from the former but put in a very different light from use in the later and 
by those currently valuing ecosystems as goods and services. 
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THE RAISON D’ÊTRE OF ECOSYSTEM VALUATION 
A variety of arguments are put forward as to the importance of placing monetary 
values on aspects of the environment and human induced changes in it.  Three are 
considered here: 
1. Pragmatism or political realism, i.e. holding the view that this is what is 
necessary to communicate in the ‘real’ world, often combined with an 
expressed belief that there are no better alternatives—used by natural scientist 
such as ecologists. 
2. Political and economic idealism: arising from a free-market, neo-liberal political 
philosophy; this sees the expression of all values via the market as the way the 
world should be run—used by industrialists and political leaders. 
3. Scientific empiricism: arguing that such values reflect truth and in particular the 
true preferences of individuals—used by orthodox economists. 
The groups identified with each are merely examples of some common 
supporters, rather than constitutive of the position or indeed a definitive position of 
the group.  The positions may readily be combined and treated as complementary.  
Alternatively, for some, they may be regarded as highly distinct, for example, 
reluctant supporters of the ecosystems services valuation project may adopt it due to 
argument 1 while strongly rejecting 2 and 3. 
Pragmatism or Political Realism 
Calculating the value in money terms of the world’s ecosystems, or less grandly, 
small parts thereof, is meant to show how important these things are for humanity.  
As the NRC report states: “Failure to include some measure of the value of 
ecosystem services in benefit-cost calculations will implicitly assign them a value of 
zero” (Heal et al., 2005: 5).  The pragmatic ‘solution’ is to fill-in the apparently 
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missing value in the accounts of firms and consumers.  This places money in the role 
of key means to communication.  Money’s dominant role in coordinating human 
exchange, trade and market activities is seen as a fundamental reality, the success 
of which makes application in all other spheres of human activity almost inevitable.  
Money may then be described as some neutral form of measure by which all things 
can be made comparable enabling trade-offs eg. between preservation and 
development. 
Money has a fundamental influence on human perception of ‘value’ and as a 
focus can be used to exclude policy options and non-market considerations.  
Recognising this point is important because of the assumption that using monetary 
valuation can only help protect the environment.  Politicians concerned with 
traditional economic growth have a different agenda and see exposing ecosystems 
values as important because they indicate from where more commodities can be 
extracted and how ecosystems can be exploited.  As the German Environment 
Minister stated the week before release of the Potsdam Initiative: “The ‘biodiversity 
treasure trove’ provides the global economy with an invaluable and extensive 
potential for innovative products and processes that is still widely untapped.”5  That 
monetary valuation may have nothing to do with biodiversity or ecosystem protection 
seems clear for economists who are concerned with trade-offs and calculating 
optimal extinction rates (Spash, 1995). 
There is, of course, something contradictory in calculating a price for 
something you do not wish to trade.  Perhaps realising this one ecological advocate 
of ecosystems valuation has tried to claim that: “Valuing ecosystem services is not 
identical to commodifying them for trade in private markets” (Costanza, 2006: 749).  
                                                 
5
 Story from BBC NEWS: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/science/nature/6432217.stm. Published: 
2007/03/09 11:55:18 GMT.  Accessed 22nd March 2007. 
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Claiming that there is no commoditisation or market like exchange involved in 
ecosystem services valuation is plainly wrong.  As the NRC report states: “The use 
of a dollar metric for quantifying values is based on the assumption that individuals 
are willing to trade the ecological service being valued for more of other goods and 
services represented by the metric (more dollars)” (Heal et al., 2005: 5).  This 
requires converting ecosystems functions into goods and services, and is clearly 
identical to a model for trading commodities in a market.  Other ecosystem service 
advocates are more open about the proactive market orientation of their position: 
“Markets do not develop spontaneously or predictably, so market design is important 
to effectiveness and equity.  Commodifying ecosystem services can be difficult” 
(Brauman et al., 2007: 86). 
Human ingenuity can create markets in all sorts of things and establish rules 
by which they are traded.  Slavery provides a good example as here there is a 
market price, a willingness to pay and acceptance of payment, and a given monetary 
value.  Yet who would say this payment reflects the worth of the human life involved?  
Clearly willingness to pay (or accept), whether actual or intended, fails to constitute a 
universal encapsulation of all value.  For example, say you earn an annual income 
which is the trade price for your labour, few would presumably claim the value of 
their life is merely annual income times life expectancy!  Yet this is what is being 
suggested for life support systems.  The total value of oxygen or water is presumably 
infinite as without them we do not survive.  That fresh air lacks a price does not 
mean it has no value merely that it is not a traded commodity and we govern its use 
via non-market institutions. 
The more begrudging supporters of ecosystem services valuation may be 
aware of its limitations in addressing the range of values at stake as systems and 
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biological diversity are lost.  They may then see this as just one input to a decision 
process.  More zealous advocates may use such an argument to ignore alternatives 
and defend their concentration on a narrow approach.  Environmental economists 
advocating CBA when confronted by its inadequacies also use this argument.  For 
example, Hanley (1995: 51-52) confesses: “It is certainly my view that CBA is 
unsuitable as a stand-alone decision mechanism, but it does remain useful as one 
input to decisions over environmental management”; but then, somewhat 
contradicting himself, states: “No other stand-alone decision mechanism exists which 
is better in every respect to CBA”, and advocates its use over all alternatives.  
Authors of the NRC report also recognise economic valuation methods as “providing 
useful information in support of improved environmental decision-making” (Heal et 
al., 2005: 4), not as the sole decision criterion.  They also note “that all kinds of value 
may ultimately contribute to decisions regarding ecosystem use, preservation, or 
restoration” (Heal et al., 2005: 33).  However, their fundamental position is that: 
“Although economic valuation does not capture all sources or types of value…it 
is much broader than usually presumed. … The broad array of values included 
under this approach is captured using the total economic value (TEV) 
framework to identify sources of this value.  Use of the TEV framework helps to 
provide a checklist of potential impacts and effects that need to be considered 
in valuing ecosystem services as comprehensively as possible” (Heal et al., 
2005: 5). 
In one paragraph they have moved from an incomplete picture to a comprehensive 
value, which then forms their exclusive focus of attention.6 
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 A later brief return to the meaning of value, in Chapter 2, mentions ‘intrinsic value’ as something 
non-anthropocentric which might have “potential validity”, but as economic valuation is 
anthropocentric such things are regarded as basically irrelevant. 
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The problem is found across the ecosystems and economic valuation 
literature, namely a lack of attention given to the alluded to ‘other values’ and the 
overall decision process in which values are included as ‘inputs’.  If economic values 
are just one input then what are the others?  There appears an admission that not all 
values can be monetised.  However, perplexingly, the principled reasons why some 
values are monetised and others are not fail to be addressed in preference for 
discussing internal critiques.  The admission that there are other inputs to a decision 
process appears to be an acceptance of both plural values and that ‘real’ decisions 
involve, whether implicitly or explicitly, some kind of multiple criteria decision 
process.  However, this logical conclusion never seems to be reached.  Neither is 
any attention paid to who in the overall process ‘makes decisions’ or how. 
Political and Economic Idealism 
Political idealism can be seen as embedded in the arguments surrounding externality 
theory in economics.  The core idea is that unsuspecting firms and consumers 
unintentionally create harms and benefits for others.  The result is inefficient 
resource allocation because harms will proliferate while benefits will be suppressed.  
There will be too much air pollution because there is no charge for using the air as a 
waste sink.  There will be too few rose gardens because passers-by get to enjoy the 
sight and smell for free.  This is the logic taken from Pigou (1920) and developed by 
environmental economists, as popularly expressed, for example, by Pearce, 
Markandya and Barbier (1989), or more recently used as justification for global cost-
benefit analysis by Stern (see Spash, 2007b). 
The free-market idealist sighs exclaiming: “If only everything in the world had 
a private property right over it and all property could be excluded from use by others 
then resources might be allocated efficiently, nay optimally!”  A price would exist for 
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everything.  Indeed the project is well underway as humanity starts to allocate rights 
over the very elemental substances from which matter is constituted i.e. carbon.  
Markets have come a long way in a few centuries of development (Polanyi, 1944). 
The lie in the position has also long been exposed for those who care to pay 
attention.  Kapp (1950) used extensive calculations to show the pervasive nature of 
the costs associated with modern economic systems whether free-market or 
socialist.  Systems in which narrow self-interest is encouraged as a virtue to the 
exclusion of all else will deliberately create harms and minimise benefits for others.  
The free-market credo often passes the buck to Adam Smith and his brief mention of 
the invisible hand while ignoring his own main life’s work which framed the human 
condition in a non-utilitarian ethical setting (Smith, 1759).  The modern market 
system may be more appropriately regarded as operating with an invisible foot as 
people boot each other around through their uncoordinated actions (Hunt and 
d'Arge, 1973).  The likes of Kapp (1950) noted the modern malaise as lying with 
inherent aspects of the political economy which positively encourage and reward 
those able to pass along harms/costs to others while reaping free benefits from 
them. 
Exploitation is the name of the game from cheap throwaway products and 
mass consumerism to resource extraction and pervasive pollution.  There is nothing 
external about ‘externalities’, rather they are an integral part of modern economic 
operations.  They are not minor aberrations on an otherwise perfectly functioning 
systems of efficient resource allocation.  What the concept of externalities reveals is 
a system wide lack of responsibility and accountability for acts of exploitation.  
Strangely then the redress is meant to come from the same system which created 
the problems but now emphasising its free-market democratic credentials. 
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Thus the political ideal claims that the market value approach allows people to 
have ‘dollar votes’ making them able to express the strength of their commitment.  
CVM surveys have been described and recommended as self-contained referenda in 
which respondents vote to tax themselves (Arrow et al., 1993: 20).  However, in such 
a system ‘use’ by rich humans is what really counts.  Several billion people live on 
less than a few dollars a day, many with a tight subsistence relationship to the 
ecosystems around them.  The environment is no luxury for these people but an 
immediate means of survival, and environmental damage has immediate 
consequences for their and their children’s health.  Yet these people have little 
disposable income to express the importance of these systems or their functions.  
One Bill Gates has far more power in the world of economic preferences than a few 
billion people with no income to spare. 
Scientific Empiricism 
The philosophy of value underlying the economic approach to the environment is 
argued to be an empirical reality because neoclassical economics is meant to be an 
empirical science.  Economic philosophy regards only the experiences of sentient 
beings as having value in their own right.  Entities give painful and pleasurable 
experiences directly or may contribute indirectly to such experiences so having only 
instrumental value.  An immediate problem with this account is the value attributed to 
sentient beings themselves because it appears only to be experiences which are of 
value rather than the beings having those experiences (Holland and Roxbee-Cox, 
1992). 
This can be seen to have led economics into the uncomfortable position of 
valuing human life as a stream of potential income i.e. a set of potential pleasures to 
be experienced.  The poor are then clearly less valuable than the rich.  International 
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controversy arose over this exact issue due to such calculations being part of the 
economists’ contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change second 
assessment report (see Spash, 2002a: 188-191).  That a being has the capacity for 
valuable experiences can be taken to matter without the occurrence of the valuable 
experiences constituting the value of that being.  A person may experience a life time 
of pain or pleasure (low or high income), but their life’s worth is a separate matter. 
Holland and Roxbee-Cox (1992) argue that the value we attach to ecological 
phenomena is of the same kind as that we attach to human beings and faces similar 
problems.  As they state: “If the theory which locates value in the experiences of 
sentient beings fails to do justice to the value we attach to human beings, it is 
unclear why we should accept it as providing an adequate theory of ecological value” 
(Holland and Roxbee-Cox, 1992: 17).  Some values may be absent from the 
interests of sentient beings while others should be discounted eg. pleasure from 
violence, torture, rape, wanton destruction of Nature.  Some alternative value 
theories are those which place value in all living things, not just sentient beings, by 
virtue of their ability to flourish; value may be argued to reside in the uninhibited 
natural state of features of Nature; inanimate Nature may be assigned value as part 
of a living organism; or features of Nature may be seen as having value due to their 
supporting role in ecosystems.  This last is differentiated from a purely instrumental 
value because of the intimate relationship in the framework of life of such features 
and is associated, by Rolston (1988), with a systemic value of ecosystems.  The 
point here is to merely outline the potential for alternative ways of taking Nature into 
consideration and that the approach being employed by advocates of ecosystem 
services valuation excludes all such alternatives without consideration. 
C.L. Spash 
13 
That such variety in environmental values exists is also more than merely of 
some academic philosophical interest.  Intrinsic value concepts are found amongst 
groups as diverse as UK land managers (Butler and Acott, 2007) and UN officials 
(Craig, Glasser and Kempton, 1993).  Empirical evidence shows that individuals give 
differential motives to valuing environmental change and associate responses to 
stated preference surveys with a variety of ethical approaches (Spash, 1997; 2000b; 
2000a).  This impacts the full range of bid responses.  At one extreme, the refusal to 
trade aspects of the environment for money can be seen as indicative of a 
lexicographic preference supporting a rights based deontological philosophy (Spash 
and Hanley, 1995; Spash, 1998).  At the other, positive willingness to pay for 
preventing environmental degradation can be associated with non-consequentialist 
reasoning which rejects an orthodox economic rationality but is nonetheless rational 
(Spash, 2006). 
Along with environmental attitudes and social norms, ethical beliefs feed into 
the reasoning over whether to engage in a process of monetary trade-off.  
Respondents who take hypothetical surveys seriously seem to enter central 
processing mode and call upon ethical positions when considering environmental 
changes (Spash, 2002b; 2006).  Interestingly then stated preference practitioners 
treat such non-economic motivation as bias, and recommend censoring and 
removing what they designate as “ethical protesting” (Hanley, Mourato and Wright, 
2001: 451; Bateman et al., 2002: 276).  The fact is that some economists practice a 
whole range of unscientific data manipulation in the search for ‘true preferences’ 
which can be accepted as compatible with economic theory and their narrow model 
of human psychology and rationality (Spash, 2008a). 
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PSYCHOLOGY, PREFERENCES AND VALUES 
In mainstream economics preferences are assumed to exist a priori so that people 
know what they want.  Values in the (actual or hypothetical) market are expressions 
of preferences which reflect an individual psychology.  The job is then for changes in 
ecosystems services to be specified, preferences stated and values observed.  
Achieving this requires meaningfully locating attributes of the environment in 
respondent’s cognition of the world. 
Ecosystems valuation has two sets of evaluative categories which for 
simplicity I will term objects and values.  Objects are the things listed as supposed 
services (eg. food provision, climate regulation, aesthetics) and their attributes (eg. 
security, feeling well, social cohesion).  As some ecosystems services advocates 
recognise: “The conditions and processes underlying ecosystem service production 
are so tightly interlinked that any classification is inherently somewhat arbitrary” 
(Brauman et al., 2007: 69).  Despite this the idea of a comprehensive classification 
system has been adopted—now commonly being taken from the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment.  This also goes well beyond the biophysical to include the 
service category ‘culture’ with its sub-categories of the spiritual, religious and 
aesthetic.  The scientist then treats valuing all such objects as merely a matter of the 
right technical solution to address internal critiques.  Hence Brauman et al. (2007: 
70) state a key requirement as being: “Formal methods for incorporating cultural 
values in a meaningful way.” 
Ecosystems services literature describes values in orthodox environmental 
economics terms and includes indirect/passive use7—option, bequest and 
                                                 
7
 Indirect/passive use values are sometimes incorrectly termed non-use values (e.g., Brauman et al., 
2007); there can be no such designation as ‘non-use’ values in economics because all economic 
value derives from the utility or usefulness it provides humans. 
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existence—values.  Any list of values is contentious, especially if it claims to be 
comprehensive eg. an individual’s total economic value.  This approach adopts 
preference utilitarianism without questioning the philosophy.  On a practical level 
only stated preferences methods are able to address the types of values being 
discussed.  This creates an immediate problem because the number of ecosystem 
services that can be explicitly included in a survey is limited eg. a choice experiment 
might address just four (Barkmann et al., 2008). 
On a more theoretical level, the inclusion of functions essential to life and 
such things as ‘spiritual values’ in the object listings implies considerable confusion 
as to what exactly is the meaning of then requesting these be measured using a 
single metric and traded-off against each other and for other goods and services.  
There is identifiable self contradiction here.  For example, Brauman et al. (2007) 
state that: 
“Although ideal metrics will likely vary with context, institutionalizing uniform 
measures facilitates comparison amongst services and between places” (p.74).  
“In general, the effectiveness of ecosystem service policy is difficult to evaluate 
because these policies usually have multiple goals and there are many metrics 
for success” (p.87).  “Monetary valuation, although not an end in itself, can be a 
powerful tool for assessment and policy making because it provides a common 
metric with which to make comparisons” (p.83 and p.89). 
The temptation is clearly to conform to the requirements of the value model being put 
forward.  Plural values and multiple criteria fail to fit within the philosophy of a single 
metric which assumes all things are commensurable. 
There are then two broad areas of concern in terms of how the ecosystems 
services advocates frame the issue.  First is how policy is misled by the search for 
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preferences to inform values.  Second is how the concept of preferences and 
choices as trade-offs offers a very limited perspective on human motivation for 
valuing the environment.  These issues are addressed in turn. 
Informing and Forming Preferences 
That public cognition differs from ecologists’ means that ecosystems functions are in 
fact alien concepts divorced from daily life.  There is then a disconnect between the 
‘goods’ demanded by the public and ecosystems services derived as outputs from 
functions conceptualised by ecological science.  Accepting this divergence means 
confronting how to inform people as to what is to be valued.  Economists persist in 
believing that people can be informed of ‘facts’ about environmental change in a 
neutral fashion.  On the contrary, evidence shows that the same uniform information 
set concerning concepts such as biodiversity will inform some and form the 
preferences of others (Spash, 2002b). 
Recognising the unfamiliarity of the public with the ecologists’ world 
description seems to conflict with wishing to avoid formation of preferences when 
valuing ecosystem services.  One suggestion is to conduct extensive qualitative pre-
studies to select “demand-relevant” ecosystem services from the existing 
understanding of the relevant population (Barkmann et al., 2008).  This effectively 
relies upon the public to frame the issue without appeals to technical or scientific 
models.  However, there is then likely to be divergence between public perceptions 
of important attributes, policy-makers’ aims and ecologists’ concerns. 
One problem is that individuals tend to focus on the immediate and in terms of 
species those higher in the food chain.  Iconic species are more appealing and easily 
commoditised.  The focus of economic valuation studies has then, unsurprisingly, 
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been upon key species, and so far has rarely addressed species diversity, and 
hardly ever ecosystems and never genetic diversity.  A survey asking the value 
people place on more panda’s in the wild is more likely to get positive responses as 
opposed to one about the value of more bamboo in the wild; even though they are 
part of the same interconnected ecosystem.  Elephants and tigers are likely to be the 
focus of public concern not more species of grass in the savannas or insects in the 
grass.  Appealing to preferences means species are preserved on the basis of 
factors such as their perceived attractiveness, size or resemblance to humans 
(Samples, Dixon and Gowen, 1986), rather than degree of endangerment.  For 
example, the variety and number of snake species kept in zoos appear to ignore 
conservation concerns by over representing common attractive species while 
maintaining really endangered species at levels far below the population limit for 
continued viability (Maresová and Frynta, 2008).  Preference driven conservation 
therefore favours selective extinction of ‘unattractive’ species. 
There is then a conflict between protecting ecosystems and appealing to 
goods of relevance to the public.  Raw preferences in the market place fail to 
recognise the goals of conservation and preservation, which is why there is a 
problem in the first place.  Ecological concerns over nutrient cycles and soil microbe 
biodiversity have little cognitive relevance for the general public and therefore 
appeals to their preferences also seem to have little relevance.  The importance of 
the integrity of whole systems is something ecology has established; why then 
employ methods aimed at preserving just the bits the public prefer eg. large 
attractive species outside the context of their habitats? 
The emphasis on preferences (direct or indirect) also raises the importance of 
geographical proximity which then adds a weighting to a particular ecosystems’ 
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values.  A barren piece of heavily maintained parkland in a city centre may have 
more economic importance than a rich bio-diverse trail set in some far distant and 
isolated wilderness.  Similarly, among two sites with the same ecological functions 
the nearest to a larger human population is likely to have greater weight in CBA 
calculations.  “It is not that one site necessarily has more value; it is simply that the 
features that give it the value it has are more accessible” (Holland and Roxbee-Cox, 
1992: 21).  The sole motivation for economic valuation is the quantity of quantifiable 
use by humans. 
This extends to indirect use values because in instrumental and preference 
utilitarian terms people value what they know.  The categories of bequest and 
existence value for entire ecosystems may be considerable (eg. Amazonian rain 
forest), or if some small obscure place perhaps miniscule (a Scottish bog in the 
highlands).  Trivial short term development benefits, measured as economic welfare, 
can easily eradicate ecosystems in the later category.  The same species can also 
be highly valued and rare in one location and common in another or even regarded 
as a pest to be eradicated (eg. possums in New Zealand as opposed to Australia).  
There is nothing inherently protective about economic valuation and indeed the 
opposite is more likely because the modern economy extols short term consumptive 
use.  If whale preservationists are not prepared to pay more than Japanese 
carnivores then whales should be eaten to extinction.  This is just efficiency at work 
with optimal resource allocation extended to optimal species extinction (Spash, 
1995). 
This raises the issue of whose preferences should count.  There is no easy 
approach to identifying the relevant population of valuers.  Two ecosystems may be 
similar but one known widely, say having been given some international designation, 
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while the other is unknown.  Those valuing iconic habitats or species which are 
known across the globe could be expected to find those which are unknown to them 
of equal value.  Then again, we might believe that World Heritage sites, for example, 
are valued by the entire human population, but who should we expect to pay for 
them and why?  If species are lost, who should be potentially compensated to meet 
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion?  What about the preferences of future generations?  Even 
forgetting that the relevant population of preferences is unknown, how preferences 
are taken into account, aggregated and weighed (eg. for income inequity) are also 
highly contentious issues. 
The focus purely upon instrumental values as they stimulate human 
preferences means many aspects of the environment may appear to have no need 
for protection or preservation.  On these grounds, where parts of the natural world 
make no contribution to human ‘welfare’ at all there is no corresponding need to 
protect it.  As Holland (1997: 485) notes, this has even been used as an argument 
for dismissing environmental concerns and in favour of traditional economic 
development, i.e. action which clearly is regarded as increasing human welfare 
defined in preference utilitarian terms.  The problem seems to lie with the whole 
approach being taken to human motivation for environmental valuation. 
Motivation and Psychology 
According to the orthodox economic model, the self preoccupied and self-centred 
modern individual is only responsive if they are made to pay or are paid for their 
actions, and a price or money value sends a clear behavioural signal.  Thus we find 
a prominent advocate of ecosystem services valuation stating “I do not agree that 
more progress will be made by appealing to people’s hearts rather than their wallets” 
(Costanza, 2006: 749).  So an implicit model of human motivation underlies the 
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money argument for conservation.  That is psychological egoism i.e. “the claim that 
people are incapable of regarding as important anything other than their own 
interests” (Holland, 1995: 30). 
The exclusive motive for an economically rational agent to value the 
environment, change in it or aspects of it, is because it has some personal use or 
utility for them.  The search for preferences then involves long lists of diverse and 
incommensurable items which bring forth a variety of responses from respondents 
when asked to state their preferences.  In particular respondents call upon non-
economic motives (Spash, 2006) and reason about their actions in ways outside 
economic understanding of psychology eg. involving norms, attitudes and personal 
perceptions of control (Spash et al., 2008).  The idea that all ecosystem attributes 
and their associated diverse values can be considered as trade-offs for monetary 
loss, or gain, appears to misunderstand how humans interact with their environment 
and make reasoned choices. 
Holland (2002) describes orthodox economic psychology as a belief/desire 
model.  This can be understood as follows: 
“Beliefs without desires are inert; desires without beliefs are blind.  Desires give 
the agent the motivational push to move, while beliefs are channels that guide 
the move to the right place.  My desire for an apple moves me to search for 
one, while my beliefs guide the search to the fruit bowl” (Holland, 2002: 18). 
Alternatively, my desire for peace and tranquillity moves me to search for isolation, 
my beliefs guide me to the woodland.  While this seems reasonable upon first 
reflection, further consideration of the implications raises several problems.  Holland 
(2002) regards the model as “deeply flawed” as a description of reasoned action on 
five grounds. 
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First, self-sacrifice, negating one’s own interests in preference for another’s, 
cannot be explained except to be dismissed as irrational.  As I have noted elsewhere 
(Spash, 2006), economics has a problem in addressing the concept of selfless or 
social-altruism.  Instead there is only selfish-altruism, the giving to others for self 
reward in one form or another. 
Second, desires can take on an addictive character and become insatiable if 
not tempered by other sources of motivation.  Desires should not be regarded as 
equally valid.  The gratification of certain desires can undermine the capacity to 
conceive what is good and moderate action.  Holland (1994: 1) cites Plato’s 
description of human psychology as a balance between three competing springs of 
motivation: appetite/desire, sense of honour/self respect, and reason.  Plato used 
love of money to exemplify the dethroning of self-respect and demeaning of a 
persons life-style.  As Holland (2002: 22) explains: 
“In Plato’s view, although desires can constitute reasons for action, they do so 
only in the context of a well-ordered and hierarchically structured psyche, 
where considerations of self respect and some overall conception of the good 
moderate the extent to which, and the manner in which, they find expression.” 
Choice construed as trade-offs removes all constraints and structure and in Plato’s 
view is the mark of a disintegrating psyche (Holland, 1994).  Modern consumerism 
then seems to push us down the slippery slope of psychic disintegration.8 
Third, desires are given a priori and lack explanation; they may even appear 
outside of our control.  Deliberation is then construed as a process of discovery, 
                                                 
8
 Holland (1995) gives the example of individual car ownership which provides freedom.  The 
unconstrained expression of this strong preference causes congestion, pollution, resource extraction, 
regular deaths and so on.  A process (such as CBA) which protects the unconstrained status of such 
a preference will not change the situation.  There is no means to register that this preference should 
not count so much in the first place. 
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searching out wants, rather than a process of reflecting upon what there is most 
reason to want.  Resolution of conflicting desires requires sensitivity to the reasons, 
their strengths and relevance, underlying motivation for those desires.  Instead 
economics offers a process of exchange where all that counts is how strongly and 
widely held is a preference or desire. 
Fourth, incommensurability refers to “an intelligible choice between feasible 
options, where there is no appropriate value in terms of which the options might be 
compared as ‘better’, ‘worse’ or approximately equal” (Holland, 2002: 23).  Choices 
involve dilemmas where values conflict (eg., duty and love, vanity and greed) and 
lack a commensurating value for comparison.  Tough decisions result in anguish 
because whatever we do may be wrong and there is no yardstick to aid us. 
“Happiness is not a homogeneous item but a mosaic of heterogeneous 
elements.  There just is no common substance—no utility—by which to 
compare, for example, the suffering experienced by an experimental animal 
with the understanding gained from the experiment” (Holland, 2002: 27). 
Fifth, a statement of preference fails to make an action intelligible.  In the 
quest for an answer as to why someone does something the response “because I 
want to” tells us nothing and indeed expresses unwillingness to provide a reason.  
As Holland (2002: 26) notes, “…to construe choices as trade-offs is to construe them 
in a way that is empty of explanatory significance.” 
Ecosystems services literature makes much of the need for trade-offs in policy 
decision processes with concerns such as habitat loss and damage to ecosystems 
functions needing to be weighted against economic growth or ‘development’.  
However, this should not be taken to mean humans reach their best choices using 
appeals to preferences or that the trade-off model of psychology found in economics 
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is relevant to making good decisions or even a good description of the choices we do 
make. 
PRACTICAL JUDGEMENT AND DELIBERATIVE PROCEDURES 
Choices over the protection of ecosystems and their functions are being placed into 
a market frame without much apparent reflection upon how different institutions 
encourage or suppress the expression of different values.  The market concerns 
exchange values and the parties to a freely entered agreement trade with mutual 
gain as each gives something (pays) and is compensated (accepts payment).  The 
shop keeper gives a product and accepts money, the consumer gives money and 
accepts goods.  That this model of behaviour is then being recommended to address 
ecosystems losses where community and environmental values are involved 
appears inappropriate and neglectful of behavioural impacts. 
More than failing to reflect some of the values of importance the economic 
approach can be transformative and destructive of value.  Paying cash for sex 
changes the relationship and meaning of the act of intercourse.  Neither friendship 
nor love can be bought.  In the case of parent-child relations paying large sums of 
money is precisely the wrong way for a parent to demonstrate how much their child 
matters to them (Holland, 1995: 22).  Believing that ‘only appeals to the wallet will 
make progress’ shows ignorance of the crowding out literature where monetary 
mechanisms remove the behaviour they intended to encourage (Frey and Jegen, 
2001). 
In contrast to the market place, monetary compensation is not a universally 
acceptable corrective, with just the amount being at issue, and may be rejected 
where communal sharing or equality are the norm.  As Holland (1995: 22) notes 
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“…to be asked to trade one’s principles, even hypothetically, is likely to seem 
inappropriate and even morally disreputable.”  For example, monetary compensation 
for environmental degradation may be regarded as a bribe designed to undermine 
community values (Claro, 2007).  This points towards the need for research into the 
appropriate approaches by which plural values held within a given society may be 
protected. 
Critiques of CBA have pointed the way towards deliberative decision 
processes where practical judgement is an input and an outcome.  Holland (1997: 
486) argues in favour of an environmental debate which recognises that 
environmentalism is more than merely a romantic attachment to Nature, but flows 
from and is the focus of some deeply felt values and commitments which require a 
suitable context and process for their articulation and defence.  Holland and Roxbee-
Cox (1992: 20) make the following modest proposal: 
“Quite simply the proposal is to replace the view that values reflect preferences 
with the view that preferences reflect values.  That is to say, preferences are no 
longer to be constructed as what constitute the environmental values; rather, 
they are to be constructed as surrogates for, or indicators of, some 
independently existing value.” 
The independent value is then seen as a motivator for expressing concern in a 
decision process which allows room for reasoning, debate and reflection.  To take an 
earlier example, we should not protect snakes on the basis of their attractiveness 
(preference utilitarianism) but because we understand there is value in life and 
diversity.  The reasons for respecting different forms of life and how they should be 
protected are then matters for debate and deliberation. 
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Moving concerns over ecosystem and biodiversity preservation back to the 
realm of judgement is then required.  Even if personal values should be respected 
they should also be open to interpersonal dispute and challenge. 
“Unlike expressions of preference and feeling, and more so than expressions 
of opinion or belief, judgements are open to being contested—open that is to 
reasoned debate and reflection.  A judgement is something for which we must 
be prepared to take responsibility, and which we must stand ready to defend…” 
(Holland, 1997: 488). 
The concentration of government and public life on a utilitarian philosophy of 
happiness, or welfare, can then be seen as having led to the assumption that such 
goals can be achieved by calculation rather than judgement.  The question of 
“consumption for what?” is replaced by more consumption as an unquestioned good 
in itself. 
A decision that a public policy be formed on the basis of stated preferences, 
replacement cost or benefit transfers is itself one requiring judgment.  Judgment is 
not optional merely hidden.  As Holland (1997: 491) notes: “One of the deepest 
illusions surrounding the practice of cost-benefit analysis is that it avoids value 
judgement.”  As is very clear in reading the Stern report, or other economic studies 
of human induced climate change, the practice is an art requiring numerous and 
repeated judgments from the appropriate treatment of the poor to the standing of 
future generations in current decisions to the characterisation of uncertainty and 
catastrophic events (Spash, 2002a; Spash, 2007b).  Clearly ecosystems and 
biodiversity valuation face the same issues which become compounded at the global 
level. 
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The role for judgement in this process may appear unclear due to the role 
allocated to objectivism and subjectivism.  That is, scientific facts are only disputable 
on grounds of factual disputation not judgement.  This is despite ever wider 
recognition of the value judgements behind scientific opinion.  Yet value judgements 
are themselves characterised as subjective opinions (effectively tastes) reflecting 
personal values which should be respected and not judged.  Policy choices can then 
hide behind either appeal to the scientist with their report on facts or the economist 
with their report on subjective preferences (Holland, 1997). 
Ecologists and conservation biologist adopting ecosystem services valuation 
now seem to be vacillating between which of the two approaches provides the best 
cover for their implicit judgments.  From the modern economists’ perspective values 
are based upon the preferences of individuals, but from the ecologists’ perspective 
such things as ecosystems existence and the value of bequesting ecosystems to 
future generations are defined by the physical characteristics of that ecosystem.  
Ecologists use their own judgment in constructing lists of ecosystems functions to be 
described as goods and services.  Economists use their own judgment in the design 
and construct of stated preference approaches (Spash, 2008a) or more generally 
CBA (Spash, 2002a).  Ecosystems valuation attempts to combine both sets of 
judgements. 
There are then two incongruous classification systems: one arising from 
environmental economics (primarily appealing to stated preferences), and the other 
arising from ecology and ecosystems functions. 
“… the science of ecology (i.e. dealing with facts and the way the natural world 
is) has tended to go hand in hand with normative claims (i.e. dealing with 
values and how the world should be, and how we ought to treat and use 
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nature), and has found it difficult to maintain a strict and lasting separation 
between ‘facts’ and ‘value’.  Eroding this strict distinction has placed ecology in 
a unique position as a ‘science’, as a form of knowledge which seems to bridge 
the natural and the social sciences” (Barry, 2006: 304-305). 
The problem facing those ecologists promoting ecosystems services valuation is that 
most of what they deem valuable is unlikely to produce meaningful WTP amongst 
the general population eg. under a CVM scenario.  Undaunted, studies place 
monetary values on changes on a large number of ecosystem functions (eg. Batker 
et al., 2005 referring to twenty three diverse functions) involving everything from 
nutrient cycling to cultural heritage.  In order to achieve these numbers the literature 
valuing ecosystem services freely borrows and transfers values from a variety of 
economic studies with little apparent consideration of the original context or 
theoretical basis of those values.  Benefit transfer is then used to produce numbers 
without having to confront the inconvenience of addressing the general public  
(Spash and Vatn, 2006).  Meanwhile the overall approach is justified as pragmatic, 
ideologically sound, empirically based and even democratic. 
That experts are making judgments and excluding the public is not 
necessarily problematic.  Instead, we may ask on what grounds are appeals being 
made to the general public in any case?  The functions of ecosystems are complex 
and numerous.  Ecologists produce long lists in which they attempt to classify these 
things using their specialist knowledge.  They effectively frame the issue for 
everyone else.  They know people fail to understand the complexity and importance 
of the various ecosystems functions.  Even university students show poor 
understanding of concepts such as biodiversity (Spash and Hanley, 1995).  That 
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information is hard to impart to others merely compounds the problem.  As Holland 
and Roxbee-Cox (1992: 21) state:  
“… if what we are seeking to discover is the value of the site, regarded as a 
value that it has independently of human interests, we must find this out from 
people who are in a position to recognise such values.  The number of such 
people is not significant. … if we are seeking the expression of informed 
preferences, then there is a clear role for the ecologist and others who will 
provide the information that will render the preferences informed.” 
The need is for informed judgment with accountability and this may or may not 
involve the public.  It does however require an open and accessible process.  
Instead the need for professional judgements in ecosystem valuation is lamented as 
“unavoidable” and to be guarded against by employing closed peer review processes 
(Heal et al., 2005: 216). 
Here the point is worth making that there is a distinction between procedure 
and outcome.  A procedure may be justified as say ‘democratic’ but this fails to justify 
the outcome which may be a poor one (Holland, 1997: 491).  Thus, “democratic 
principles imply a right to be considered; but they do not imply a right to count, or to 
determine the outcome” (Holland, 2002: 33).  An important aspect of modern 
democracy is the protection of the minority against the tyranny of the majority (mob 
rule).  This becomes especially important where voices are silent eg., non-humans, 
future generations.  Thus, constitutional safeguards prevent over zealous 
manipulation of policy by citizens of the day due to concerns of the day.  As Holland 
(1995: 37-38) states: 
“Regarding environmental issues too, we need perhaps to cultivate the same 
sense that these are matters of a particularly fundamental kind, whose 
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significance reaches from the past and extends to the future, and concerning 
which, therefore, it is appropriate to ‘consult’ the citizens of the past and those 
of the future, as well as those of today.” 
This consultation requires taking note of how silent voices can be represented in 
decision processes (see O'Neill, 2001). 
Holland (1997) recommends deliberative institutions for addressing conflicts 
of value because a process of accommodation is required in which a plurality of 
principles can be reconfigured while permitting respect for principles.  He sees the 
distinctive character of deliberation about values as involving: (i) non-negotiable 
positions eg. refusing compensation so as to hold to a right or promise is perfectly 
rational, contrary to economic logic; (ii) sacrificing interests so as to hold to 
principles; (iii) the potential for values to inform whether preferences or interests 
count eg. some preferences may be judged disgraceful, mean or despicable, others 
honourable but unobtainable; (iv) recognition that principles relinquished may be 
impossible to compensate by gain in interests or honouring of other principles; (vi) 
recognition that principles abandoned can results in feelings of guilt, compromise of 
integrity and threat to self identity, which is very different from disappointment at not 
fulfilling one’s interests.  This is a process in stark contrast to the economic weighing 
and balancing of interests on a single scale with all judgements kept hidden or 
shrouded in the technical detail of the internal criticism which constitutes a peer 
review process. 
In practical terms the potential for alternative institutional arrangements for 
articulating values must be explored (Vatn, 2005).  Plural values including monetary 
considerations might be addressed through some forms of small group deliberative 
monetary valuation (Spash, 2007a; 2008b).  Space precludes covering these and 
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other available alternatives which exists, their relative merits or otherwise (for some 
further coverage see Getzner, Spash and Stagl, 2005; Kallis et al., 2006; Spash and 
Vatn, 2006).  Suffice to say, where environmental policy requires budgetary choices 
what must be avoided is the pretence that either total value or some transferable 
price can be derived for various entities, upon which trade-offs may now be 
calculated.  Little has also been said of representation.  I would argue the need here 
is to be inclusive of plural values whether the group is constituted of experts, vested 
interests or members of the public.  What is clear is that a variety of new institutional 
approaches are required. 
“The penalty for not developing institutions in which ethical and other deeply 
felt concerns can be properly voiced will be residues of grievance, mistrust, 
injustice and guilt which are as corrosive of the civic body as are pollutants in 
the natural environment” (Holland, 2002: 33). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Modern economics professes to be an empirically based science but seems to 
defend highly abstract theory over empirical fact.  The ideological position held by 
mainstream economists concerning what constitutes value in society is used to 
reinforce a specific model of political economy.  Ecologists and conservation 
biologists then appear to be rather naively attempting to employ the economic value 
approach without showing much awareness of the political system within which it is 
embedded.  The problem then is that values which fail to fall within the ideological 
constructs must be ignored, excluded or transformed into those which do.  The 
articulation of those values requires the design and implementation of specific 
institutions which control and manipulate the type and range of values allowed into 
the decision-making process.  That different institutional processes result in different 
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values being articulated seems poorly understood by both economists and ecologists 
trying to value ecosystems as goods and services. 
The idea of monetary valuation work is not just to show a value exists but that 
it is tangible in economic terms.  The belief then is that this will affect human 
behaviour because if only people knew how much money biodiversity and 
ecosystems services were worth they would do something about preserving them.  
One response from ecologists is to produce lists of what ecosystems ‘goods and 
services’ people should value, in their opinion.  Any stated preference survey using 
these lists then needs to make a case explaining why the respondent should value 
things on the list.  Realising people may not value and/or understand the listed items 
has led some to transfer values from wherever appears convenient and use their 
own judgment to calculate total systems values.  Yet there seems inadequate 
comprehension, or at least discussion, of the arbitrary nature of any outcomes from 
this approach, its biases and limitations. 
That judgment is required is not per se the problem.  The problem is how 
judgment is concealed and used to frame public policy.  The approach to ecosystem 
services valuation encapsulates an implicit model of both human behaviour and the 
relevant decision process for addressing environmental problems.  The standard 
justifications for this are embedded in support for or acceptance of the dominance of 
market systems.  This ignores the many ways in which humans operate outside such 
systems and without being psychological egoists whose only concern is their wallet.  
Taking human motivation into account is necessary to address why ecosystems are 
being destroyed and biodiversity lost.  This implies something more is required than 
valuation studies placing numbers on ecosystems characterised as goods and 
services so that they can be ‘taken into account’. 
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